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etween now and 2025—a widely used strategic planning horizon—the 
world’s major economies will likely still depend to a large degree on tra-
ditional energy sources. Oil and liquefi ed natural gas (LNG), despite their eco-
nomic and strategic differences, are the two with inherent naval signifi cance, as 
they must be transported by sea to the extent that domestic supplies or overland 
pipelines are insuffi cient.1 Indeed, maritime transport is properly conceived 
as a default, as it is almost always signifi cantly cheaper than any overland al-
ternatives, many of which are simply impractical in any case. The recent 
global recession has further reduced tanker rates. Private-sector analysts have 
produced detailed forecasts of supply and demand for these two critical com-
modities. But no researchers have yet produced a detailed study of the strategic 
and naval implications of Chinese energy access.2 The market focus of energy 
intelligence fi rms and the lack of security and technical information informing 
journalists in the energy fi eld have so far precluded analysis of the issue.
This gap must be fi lled. The National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 
2025 report “projects a still-preeminent U.S. joined by fast developing powers, 
notably India and China, atop a multipolar international system” that “will 
be subject to an increased likelihood of confl ict over scarce resources”—one 
of them being energy.3 Russia will have great infl uence as an energy supplier. 
“No other countries are projected to rise to the level of China, India, or Russia, 
and none is likely to match their individual global clout.”4 More specifi cally, 
“Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and 
modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue-water 
naval capabilities.”5 
Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins
The Reality, and Strategic Consequences, of Seaborne Imports 
CHINA’S OIL SECURITY PIPE DREAM
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Useful insights into these potential trends can be gained by considering the 
physical and economic realities of oil transshipment. This article assesses the 
relative dependence of China (as a consumer) on seaborne oil fl ows between 
now and 2025. China’s oil security concerns will help shape its military and 
policy priorities fundamentally, with signifi cant implications for the U.S. Navy 
in coming years. For the present, it underscores a question of fundamental im-
portance concerning China’s strategic orientation: To what extent will China 
seek to transform itself from a continental to a continental-maritime power?6
Chinese oil demand, growing rapidly, has reached 8.5 million barrels* per 
day (mbpd), even amid the global recession.7 China became a net oil importer 
in 1993 and likely became a net gasoline importer by the end of 2009. While still 
a very signifi cant oil producer, China is now the world’s second-largest oil user. 
It now imports half of its crude oil, with imports reaching a record 4.6 million 
bpd in July 2009.8 Seaborne imports, which overland pipelines will not reduce, 
constitute more than 80 percent of this total.9 At present, therefore, 40 percent 
of China’s oil comes by sea.
Chinese security analysts and policy makers worry about their nation’s “ex-
cessive” reliance on seaborne oil shipments. Many believe that by investing in 
pipelines to deliver oil from neighboring oil producers like Russia and Kazakh-
stan and building additional lines to “bypass” the Malacca Strait, China can 
protect its oil imports from possible interdiction during a confl ict. 
A robust internal debate is being waged within China at multiple levels and 
across a number of disciplines regarding how to ensure access to oil supplies. 
At stake is the extent to which China should cooperate with international eco-
nomic institutions versus seeking unilateral military solutions;10 should de-
velop as a maritime versus continental power; and should focus on defending 
against state, as opposed to nonstate, actors.11 Despite this diversity of opinion, 
a wide variety of infl uential Chinese experts, including scholars, policy analysts, 
and members of the military, believe that the United States can sever China’s 
seaborne energy supplies at will and in a crisis might well choose to do so.12 It 
is widely claimed, for instance, that “whoever controls the Strait of Malacca ef-
fectively grips China’s strategic energy passage, and can threaten China’s energy 
security at any time.”13 
Such views are widely cited to justify pipeline construction, which is proceed-
ing rapidly. China already has fi fty thousand kilometers of oil and gas pipelines 
and will nearly double the amount, to ninety thousand, during the Twelfth Five-
Year Plan (2011–15).14
* There are 7.3 barrels of oil in a ton. 
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Yet as this analysis will demonstrate, China’s overland oil supply plans may 
largely be a “pipe dream,” driven by a combination of a misunderstanding of 
global oil market mechanisms, incomplete assessment of security issues, and the 
lobbying by sectoral and local commercial and political interests of a massively 
overtaxed national energy policy-making apparatus. Some projects—such as 
the line from Russia that is now under construction and an existing line from 
Kazakhstan—are indeed economically viable overland projects that will bring 
at least limited diversity to China’s oil supplies. Others, however, like the pro-
posed lines through Burma and Pakistan, make much less economic and secu-
rity sense. 
In the end, pipelines are not likely to increase Chinese oil import security in 
quantitative terms, because the additional volumes they bring in will be over-
whelmed by China’s demand growth; the country’s net reliance on seaborne oil 
imports will grow over time, pipelines notwithstanding. If we estimate Chinese 
oil-import-demand growth conservatively at an average of 2.5 percent annually 
over the next fi ve years, Beijing’s imports will still increase by a total of around 
650,000 barrels a day—more than the combined volume that the pipelines from 
Russia and Kazakhstan will likely be able to bring in by 2013.15 Of that total, 
the 300,000 bpd from Russia will not be “new” overland supplies but, rather, 
consist primarily of a transfer from rail to pipe as the crude volumes previously 
carried into China by train are moved into the pipeline instead. The proposed 
Burma–China and Pakistan–China lines are simply “shortcut” routes, not true 
overland supply alternatives; oil will still have to be carried by sea in tankers to 
the pipelines’ starting points.
A total fi gure for these two sources, Russia and Kazakhstan, of around 
500,000 bpd may seem low, but it refl ects the reality that China’s neighbors have 
limited capacity to offset its seaborne oil imports. Their reserves are limited in 
key potential supply areas (e.g., eastern Siberia), and politics further complicate 
the picture. Kazakhstan, for its part, is pursuing a three-vector oil export policy. 
It entails shipping oil through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium line to the Rus-
sian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk; to China through the Atasu–Alashankou 
line; and, soon, through the $1.5 billion Kazakhstan Caspian Pipeline System to 
a port on the Caspian Sea, from which it will be carried by tanker to Azerbaijan, 
there to enter the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline.16 Russian sources say the third 
route may ultimately be able to pump up to fi fty-six million tons a year of oil.17 
Russia, meanwhile, may prioritize oil supplies to the East Siberia–Pacifi c 
pipeline, feeding the port of Kozmino, on the Sea of Japan near Nakhodka; from 
there it can be exported to Japan, South Korea, China, the United States, and 
other Pacifi c Basin consumers, not China alone. A spur pipeline from Russia to 
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China is now under construction and is scheduled to enter service in the second 
half of 2010. Detailed analysis of the project is included later in the study.
Pipelines are more vulnerable to sabotage and military interdiction than 
seaborne shipping is. Projects (like the Burma–China pipeline) designed to help 
seaborne shipments bypass choke points are expensive, can be blockaded, and 
are themselves vulnerable to physical attack by nonstate actors or other parties. 
Seaborne shipping, by contrast, is very fl exible and can be routed around dis-
ruptions. For this reason, pipeline plans predicated on the idea that bypassing 
the Strait of Malacca increases oil security are fundamentally fl awed. Even if 
Malacca were completely sealed off by blockade or accident, tankers could be 
diverted through the Sunda, Lombok, or other passages with some disruption 
in deliveries and at an additional cost of as little as one or two dollars per bar-
rel.18 Some Chinese analysts now share this conclusion, one noting that “SLOC 
[sea line of communication] security is much more important than pipeline 
transport lines.”19
Finally, as fi gure 1 demonstrates, pipelines are far more expensive than tankers 
in terms of what must be spent to move a given volume of oil a given distance.20 
Certain pipelines—such as the Pakistan, and possibly the Burma, projects—
will likely require substantial subsidies if they are to compete with seaborne 
imports. Much of the cost of supporting such uneconomical projects, which are 
driven more by politics than profi ts, will fall on the Chinese government, which 
already faces substantial energy-subsidy costs as well as the demands of its four-
trillion-RMB stimulus package.
The fi rst portion of the analysis will examine operational and prospective 
pipelines oriented toward China. The projects are arranged chronologically 
in the order that they have, will, or might become operational. At present, the 
Kazakhstan–China pipeline is operating at partial capacity, a Russia–China line 
could become operational by late 2010 (and is likely to be in commercial op-
eration by 2011), the Burma–China pipeline is now under construction, and a 
China–Pakistan pipeline remains entirely aspirational.21 
FIGURE 1
SAMPLE OIL TRANSPORT COSTS TO CHINA
Notes:
a. VLCC at $150k/day charter, 2 million bpd cargo. 
b. Transneft tariff of 15.41 rubles/ton/100 km. 
c. Based on weighted average of Russian Railways’ oil tariffs to Zabaikalsk and Naushki.
MODE ROUTE DISTANCE (KM) COST (US$/BBL) COST (US$/BBL/1000 KM)
Tankera Ras Tanura–Ningbo 7000 1.25 0.18
Pipelineb Angarsk–Daqing 3200 2.41 0.75
Trainc Angarsk–Manzhouli 1000 7.19 7.19 
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The second portion of the study will examine Chinese views of how pipelines 
might enhance China’s oil security and assess the potential for, and utility and 
disadvantages of, a pipeline-centric oil-security strategy. The fi nal, and conclud-
ing, section will suggest how China might enhance its energy security at lower 
fi nancial and diplomatic cost.
In the outline that follows of current and possible pipeline projects, fear that 
nonstate actors or foreign navies could interdict oil shipments to China will be 
prominent as a factor that impels the national government to support overland 
supply projects. Yet it should be noted at the outset that national oil companies 
may be playing on that fear, the sense of oil insecurity among high-level decision 
makers, in order to obtain further state support. Provincial and local offi cials 
are likely doing so to secure projects that could create substantial local invest-
ment and job growth. 
Indeed, if one averages labor-demand numbers for sample refi nery expansion 
and newbuild projects in the West and the developing world, a 200,000 bpd re-
fi nery, such as that which may be built near Kunming, could create ten thousand 
or more construction and engineering jobs while it is being built and at least 
several hundred permanent positions to run the plant thereafter.22 Building the 
pipeline itself and associated storage and pumping facilities would create addi-
tional temporary and permanent jobs.
Understanding the real benefi ts that pipeline and associated refi nery con-
struction would bring local governments makes it imperative to remember in 
what follows that local interests and overall Chinese national energy-security 
interests must be kept separate. What is benefi cial at the local level, or to a cer-
tain subset of corporate actors, may not always be the most effective policy for 
addressing national strategic concerns. In this sense, signifi cant portions of Chi-
na’s push for pipelines mirror the “Going Out” oil security strategy, in which the 
state oil companies cultivated fears of oil insecurity in Beijing and then turned 
around and wrapped themselves in the fl ag as they sought overseas oil projects. 
These projects have boosted their incomes and reserves but have done little to 
enhance China’s oil security on the national level; these fi rms have even dam-
aged China’s image abroad, through their dealings with Sudan and other pariah 
states.23
KAZAKHSTAN–CHINA PIPELINE
The Kazakhstan–China pipeline is currently China’s only operational overland 
oil pipeline project. China previously imported Kazakh crude by rail through 
the entry port of Alashankou, in Xinjiang. To move larger volumes and to lower 
shipping prices, however, both sides desired a pipeline. In September 1997, the 
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Chinese and Kazakh governments signed the General Agreement on the Proj-
ect of Oil Deposits Development and Pipeline Construction.24 The initial stage 
of the line was built from Kenkiyak to Atyrau during 2002–2004, the second 
stage during 2004–2006 from Atyrau to the Chinese border at Alashankou.25 
The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) funded the construction 
cost of $806 million for the thousand-kilometer leg from Atasu to Alashankou, 
as well as the cost of a 252 km extension from Alashankou to the refi nery at 
Dushanzi, also in Xinjiang.26
The pipeline is operated by a joint stock company called MunaiTas North-
West Pipeline Company CJSC, which is backed by China National Petroleum 
Corporation and KazMunaiGaz. Its current capacity is approximately 200,000 
bpd. In 2008, however, China imported an average of only 115,000 bpd of crude 
oil from Kazakhstan by pipeline and rail.27 In December 2007, the pipeline car-
ried an average of 102,600 bpd—only about half of its total capacity—due to 
pricing disputes and problems with supply availability that created gaps, only 
partially fi lled with Russian crude from western Siberia. The line has carried 
Kazakh Kumkol crude as well as crudes from Russia.28 This situation is due to 
the fact that current Kazakh production does not yet completely fi ll the line and 
also because lighter, less waxy Russian oils are blended with waxy Kazakh crudes 
during the winter to prevent them from solidifying and blocking the line. 
Figure 2 shows the current pipeline and future planned additions. Now that 
the segment from Kenkiyak to Kumkol is completed, Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea 
production (in the Tengiz and Kashagan fi elds) can enter a pipeline network 
reaching deep into China. In August 2007, CNPC opened a 400,000-bpd-capacity 
crude oil pipeline from Shanshan in Xinjiang to the refi ning center at Lan-
zhou, in Gansu Province.29 This line, and a parallel oil products pipeline, will 
allow crude and refi ned products from Xinjiang to be shipped to Lanzhou and 
then into CNPC’s existing pipeline network serving central and southwestern 
China. This will permit Kazakh crude to penetrate deep into China, because 
as crude oil and products from the Dushanzi refi nery can be shipped farther 
east, boosting oil supplies to the inland regions that will be a focus of Beijing’s 
development program, regional economic disparities will be reduced. The 
Kazakhstan–China pipeline will also be integrated with a new strategic petro-
leum reserve site under construction near Ürümqi, which will store fi fty-one 
million barrels of crude once completed.30 The line could reach a maximum 
throughput capacity of 400,000 bpd in 2011, if its fi nal stage, from Kenkiyak to 
Kumkol, reaches its full capacity by that time. 
While this pipeline project originated in part due to oil-supply security con-
cerns, it is easily justifi able as the most economic way to bring Kazakh crude 
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oil into the western Chinese market. China wins, because it gains what it sees 
as “secure” oil supplies; Kazakhstan gains a crude export route independent of 
Russia and a new market for its oil; and Russian companies gain an additional 
route for getting western Siberian crude oil production into the Chinese market.
A RUSSIA–CHINA PIPELINE
China views Russia as a rich and secure oil source capable of delivering crude 
overland, far from U.S. Navy–patrolled sea routes. China and Russia fi rst began 
discussing a pipeline in 1994. Yukos unveiled plans in 2001 to construct a pipe-
line from Angarsk to Daqing. These plans were suspended during the Kremlin’s 
2004–2007 assault on Yukos and have been superseded by Transneft’s massive 
East Siberia–Pacifi c Ocean (ESPO) pipeline. The ESPO’s fi rst section, from 
Taishet to Skovorodino, is complete and can now pump crude, although as of 
September 2009 the line was running in reverse, moving crude into the existing 
western Siberian pipeline network. The second half of the line runs 2,100 km 
FIGURE 2
KAZAKHSTAN–CHINA OIL PIPELINE: EXISTING ROUTE
existing
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from Skovorodino to Nakhodka, on the Sea of Japan, and the entire line may 
not be fully operational until 2025.31 Figure 3 shows oil pipelines existing, under 
construction, and planned from Russia. 
In the meantime, China has been importing increasing volumes of crude 
from Russia by rail (as well as smaller volumes through the Kazakhstan–China 
pipeline). In 2007 and 2008, China imported an average of more than 300,000 
bpd of Russian crude.32 Shipping crude by rail can cost twice as much as shipping 
it by pipeline, however.33 Driven by this reality and by the fact that regional rail 
infrastructure likely cannot handle China’s ultimately desired crude volumes, 
CNPC and Sinopec (the primary Chinese buyers of Russian crude) pushed for 
construction of a spur pipeline from Skovorodino to Daqing, in Heilongjiang 
Province. The entire spur line will run roughly a thousand kilometers (seventy 
kilometers on the Russian side and 965 km on the Chinese side) and will cost 
around $436 million.34 The Chinese side is fi nancing the majority of the spur’s 
length, as it lies largely on Chinese soil. Initial capacity is slated to be fi fteen mil-
lion tons per year (300,000 bpd), with the possibility of later expansion to thirty 
million tons annually (600,000 bpd).35 
Pricing disputes and a relative lack of profi tability restrained Russian pipeline 
export plans to China for more than a decade. Until very recently, CNPC and 
Rosneft had serious disputes over rail crude-pricing formulas, and it is likely 
that similar issues may have affected the pipeline project. This would not be 
surprising, as the Kazakhstan–China pipeline has often run at below capacity 
FIGURE 3
RUSSIA–CHINA OIL PIPELINES: EXISTING, UNDER CONSTRUCTION, AND PLANNED
under construction existing
 planned
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due to pricing disputes.36 Russian Railways, run by Viktor Yakunin, a Putin ac-
quaintance and former KGB offi cer, also opposed pipeline construction, which 
would erode Russian Railways’ substantial income from hauling oil to China.
The global fi nancial crisis and Russian companies’ need for cash have changed 
the landscape, however. In April 2009, Transneft and Rosneft signed an agree-
ment for a $25 billion loan from China Development Bank in exchange for de-
livering 300,000 bpd of oil to China for the next twenty years and also building a 
64 km spur pipeline from Skovorodino to the Chinese border, according to RIA 
Novosti. Russia’s powerful railway lobby originally opposed the pipeline plan 
but in June 2008 the Russian Railways CEO retracted his prior opposition to the 
plan, saying instead that he hopes to ship marginal high-grade crude volumes 
of a few million tons per year to China.37 Higher-quality crudes lose value when 
blended with lower-quality oils for pipeline shipment.
Russia’s decision to ship oil to China by pipeline was driven in part by eco-
nomic necessity, as Rosneft and Transneft needed a cash infusion in early 2009. 
It was also driven by the imperative of cementing the Sino-Russian energy re-
lationship with a large-scale supply deal. During summer 2008, sources close 
to Rosneft indicated that despite the Russian government’s growing desire for a 
pipeline to China, the company wanted to stall the spur pipeline for as long as 
possible due to the route’s lower profi tability relative to other options.38 
The immediate economics of crude export from eastern Siberia changed in 
July 2009 as the Kremlin ordered a nine-month-long suspension of oil export 
duties on production from thirteen key oil fi elds, including Rosneft’s large new 
Vankor fi eld. That said, given Russia’s gaping budget defi cit as of December 2009 
and resulting hunger for tax revenues, we believe there is a medium probability 
that the tax holiday will not be extended for more than twenty-four months, 
since it is more politically expedient to raise revenue by ending an oil tax holiday 
than by taxing citizens on food, alcohol, and other goods. 
While the China–Russia pipeline deal is presently on track, there are still 
a number of potential friction points. Rosneft may still worry that near- and 
medium-term production from eastern Siberia cannot fi ll the spur line and en-
sure adequate supplies to the new 400,000 bpd refi nery that the company plans 
to build near the Pacifi c port of Nakhodka.
Perhaps of greatest concern to Beijing, Moscow has and will have options to 
divert oil from China if it so desires. While the initial capacity of Russia’s line to 
China will be 300,000 bpd, and could rise to 600,000 bpd, an alternative pipe-
line to the Pacifi c coast (perhaps with initial capacity available within ten years; 
and spurred by the potential Rosneft refi nery at Nakhodka) could ultimately 
offer Moscow oil diversion alternatives that it might possibly use to pressure 
China. Russia can also move suffi cient volumes of crude oil by rail to the Pacifi c 
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Ocean to allow it to cut off a substantial portion of pipeline exports to China 
in the event of a dispute. Transneft does not operate under the normal eco-
nomic incentives that U.S. and European pipeline operators do, meaning that 
if ordered by the Kremlin, the company will favor achieving political objectives 
over the need to keep capacity utilization high to maximize earnings and please 
shareholders. 
A BURMA–CHINA PIPELINE 
The proposed Burma–China oil pipeline aims to reduce China’s reliance on oil 
shipped through the Malacca Strait. The idea of the pipeline was fi rst articulated 
publicly in 2004 by Yunnan University professor Yang Xiaohui.39 Yang argued 
that given Burma and Southeast Asia’s historical collective role as a “backdoor” 
supply line for China, a Burma–China line would reduce reliance on Malacca 
and help secure Chinese oil imports.40
National and local economic development interests then worked to generate 
additional support for the project. The Yunnan provincial government subse-
quently professed its support for the project, and in early 2006 the Burma–China 
pipeline emerged on the national radar screen when the National Development 
and Reform Commission’s (NDRC’s) 2005 “Refi ning Industry Development 
Overview” named it one of four key oil import channels.41 Figure 4 shows the 
proposed pipeline route and facilities that might be associated with the project. 
It appears that CNPC will fi nance the bulk of the line’s construction costs, 
in addition to supporting infrastructure. If the project proceeds, by 2010 CNPC 
plans to construct an oil wharf capable of berthing tankers of 300,000 dead-
weight tonnage, as well as storage facilities capable of holding more than four 
million barrels of crude.42 The project will be a key element of China’s plans to 
promote inland economic development, as its southwest provinces of Yunnan, 
Tibet, Guizhou, and Guangxi, as well as Chongqing Municipality, often have 
diffi culty receiving stable fuel supplies from the refi ning centers at Lanzhou and 
Guangzhou.43
One proposal includes constructing a 400,000 bpd refi nery and a co-
located million-ton-per-year ethylene plant near Kunming, Yunnan.44 The gov-
ernment of Chongqing Municipality, with the support of Sinopec, has also pro-
posed extending the line to Chongqing and building refi ning facilities there.45 
The pipeline’s initial capacity is slated to be 200,000 bpd, but if it is expanded 
to 300,000 or 400,000 bpd both Kunming and Chongqing could build refi ner-
ies of signifi cant size. It is currently unclear whether or not the tragic May 2008 
Sichuan earthquake might cause national and provincial offi cials to reconsider 
locating a large refi nery near an active seismic zone.
The NDRC might prefer constructing refi neries near both cities, as it allows 
both areas to gain economically and would also permit the central government 
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to reward both of the main state-owned refi ners, CNPC and Sinopec. Southwest 
China is currently a zone of competition between the two, with traditional oil 
company “spheres of infl uence” overlapping increasingly as each company seeks 
a greater degree of vertical integration and tries to seize market share.46 For ex-
ample, CNPC and Sinopec competed vigorously in early 2007 to win approval to 
build a 200,000 bpd refi nery in Guangxi.47 CNPC emerged victorious, probably 
because it can use its fl agship Sudan project to guarantee crude oil supplies to 
the refi nery.
From the economic perspective, a Burma–China pipeline may make sense, 
as the costs of piping crude to inland refi neries in southwest China and then 
distributing refi ned products through the expanding pipeline network likely ap-
proximate those of shipping crude by tanker to southeast China, refi ning it there, 
and then shipping products by pipe or rail to southwest Chinese consumers. 
A comparative example of overland pipeline crude competing successfully 
with seaborne crude in a continental market is that of Canadian oil imports into 
the midwestern United States. Recently, the well developed American pipeline 
FIGURE 4
BURMA–CHINA OIL PIPELINE: PROPOSED ROUTE AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES
under construction
disputed area
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network has allowed Canadian crude to penetrate almost to the Gulf Coast, the 
epicenter of U.S. seaborne crude imports.48 China’s pipeline network for crude 
and products cannot compare with that of the United States at present, but the 
NDRC and the state oil companies are working quickly to expand China’s do-
mestic pipeline systems for oil and refi ned products, so regional markets are 
likely to become increasingly integrated over time.
The Burma–China pipeline also provides an impetus for enhancing crude 
and product supplies by building additional regional refi neries and expanding 
the area’s product pipeline networks. Oil product demand, particularly for mo-
tor fuels, has been growing strongly in southwestern China in recent years as 
the area undergoes rapid economic development and consumer incomes rise. 
Historically, the region has been short on refi ning capacity and a refi nery at the 
terminus of the pipeline from Burma would help to address this defi ciency.49 
Expanding regional oil-processing capacity will also create signifi cant employ-
ment, through construction work and, later, for manning the facilities. As China 
reforms its domestic oil pricing system, having refi neries in remote southwest 
China might give the owner of those plants a high degree of price-setting power 
and the ability to charge a premium for fuel produced.
From the security perspective, however, a Burma–China pipeline largely fails 
the test. It would allow around 200,000 bpd of oil imports to bypass the Ma lacca 
Strait, yet it would be exposed to major security risks in Burma, which is ruled by 
a capricious junta and still struggles with ethnic separatism in regions through 
which the pipeline will pass.50 Separatism still smolders in Burma’s hinterlands, 
as evidenced by the August 2009 clashes in Burma’s Kokang region that sent at 
least thirty thousand refugees streaming into China’s Yunnan Province. Transit 
countries hosting pipelines gain signifi cant strategic leverage. This leverage can 
manifest itself in calculated strategic moves or in disputes over other factors, 
such as pricing and transit payments. For example, Ukraine effectively reduced 
European natural-gas supplies in the winter of 2005–2006 by siphoning off gas 
to replace supplies to Ukraine that Gazprom had cut and was able thereby to put 
Russia in a very diffi cult position diplomatically. The same dynamic unfolded in 
even starker fashion when Gazprom cut off gas supplies to Ukraine in January 
2009 and gas supplies actually stopped for several days to a number of Eastern 
and Central European consumers of Russian gas.
China would also be seen as directly fi nancing the Burmese junta’s rule and 
its repression of the population, since an operational oil line would likely gen-
erate direct transit payments of at least fourteen million dollars a year.51 Fur-
thermore, in the event of confl ict, the oil port/pipeline terminus at Sittwe on 
Burma’s coast would be a concentrated target set, highly vulnerable to blockade 
or precision strike. 
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A proposed canal across Thailand’s Kra Isthmus, now stalled, appears un-
realistic. Zhang Xuegang, a scholar at the China Institutes of Contemporary 
International Relations, maintains optimistically that it “could . . . provide a 
strategic seaway to the Chinese navy” through which “fl eets could . . . more 
easily protect the nearby sea-lanes and gain access to the Indian Ocean.”52 But 
a canal across the isthmus could cost twenty billion dollars or more to build 
and, like the Burma–China pipeline, would simply concentrate the target set for 
potential blockaders. 
A PAKISTAN–CHINA PIPELINE? 
Some Pakistani and Chinese analysts have also suggested the possibility of 
building an “energy corridor,” including oil pipelines, from Pakistan into west-
ern China to diversify China’s oil import routes and avoid the Malacca Strait.53 
Yet other Chinese analysts increasingly recognize that geographic and security 
barriers render a Pakistan–China oil pipeline unfeasible in the near and me-
dium terms.54
These Chinese analysts express grave reservations about the security situa-
tion in Pakistan in light of the country’s perpetual violence and increasing po-
litical instability, along with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorist 
attacks against outsiders. Indeed, Chinese workers have been kidnapped and 
killed in at least three separate incidents in western and northwestern Pakistan, 
the regions that would be traversed by a Pakistan–China pipeline.55 The pipeline 
would also transit a part of Kashmir that, while controlled by Pakistan, is also 
claimed by India. Figure 5 shows the currently proposed route of a Pakistan–
China oil pipeline. In addition to security problems, there would also be serious 
fi nancial barriers, since oil transport costs could run to at least ten dollars a bar-
rel to achieve payout plus a 10 percent rate of return. 
Even at a price above a hundred dollars a barrel, a transport cost of nine 
to ten dollars a barrel is very high compared to that of seaborne shipping. If a 
Chinese oil company chose to move 200,000 bpd of crude through the Burma–
China pipeline and 250,000 bpd through the Pakistan–China line, it could lose 
roughly a billion dollars a year compared to what it would have paid to move the 
oil by sea to eastern China.* Beijing would likely have to subsidize such opera-
tions, either directly or indirectly. A billion dollars is roughly 6.8 billion RMB at 
today’s exchange rates and exceeds by 30 percent the Chinese government’s total 
of 4.9 billion RMB in subsidy payments to refi ners in 2007.
If the Chinese government allowed fuel to be sold at market prices, compa-
nies might have a much higher incentive to build pipelines into remote areas 
* This assumes a transport cost difference between pipeline and sea transport of $3/bbl for oil moving 
through the Burma–China line and $7/bbl for oil moving through the Pakistan–China line.
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like western and southwestern China; regional fuel defi cits could allow them 
to charge premium rates for fuels produced by refi neries at the end of the pipe-
line. Under these conditions, pipeline plans might be more fi nancially attractive 
than they are now, with Chinese oil product prices lagging international market 
prices by 15–20 percent during times of high crude oil prices, such as those of 
midsummer 2008.
Geography and cost alone would pose major challenges, however, even under 
the best of conditions. The pipeline would have to be constructed in some of 
the world’s most challenging terrain. Moreover, it would need to lift oil from 
sea level at Gwadar up to the 15,400-foot-high Khunjerab Pass, requiring mas-
sive pumping power and steady electrical supplies in remote areas vulnerable 
to insurgent activity. By way of comparison, the Trans-Alaska and Baku–Tbilisi–
Ceyhan pipelines climb from sea level to apogees of 2,800 feet and 9,000 feet, 
FIGURE 5
PAKISTAN–CHINA OIL PIPELINE: PROPOSED ROUTE
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respectively, before returning to sea level.56 The Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline 
(TEP) climbs from a thousand feet above sea level to 13,300 feet above sea lev-
el in the relatively short distance of 125 miles, making some cite the TEP as 
an example of the “technical feasibility” of a pipeline from Pakistan to China. 
However, further analysis causes that comparison to fall short, because at 310 
miles the TEP is only about one-fi fth the length of the proposed pipeline from 
Pakistan to China and does not cross territory rife with insurgent activity and 
general instability. 
Despite the major challenges, there is still considerable discussion from a va-
riety of Pakistani and Indian sources regarding the latent strategic value of the 
new port at Gwadar, in western Pakistan along the Arabian Sea, a likely start-
ing point for any Pakistan–China oil pipeline. For all of the hype about the 
development of Gwadar as a facility to support Chinese naval operations in the 
Indian Ocean, however, there is in fact very little hard evidence to suggest this 
is the case, and the contract for the management of the port was awarded to the 
Port Authority of Singapore. In fact, barring a major shift by the Chinese side, it 
appears that the main impetus for establishing an “energy corridor” is coming 
from the Pakistani side.57 President Pervez Musharraf pushed the idea in June 
2006 and apparently raised the issue again during talks with President Hu Jintao 
during the April 2008 Bo’ao Forum, but with no apparent results to date.58 
DOWNSIDES
The enthusiasm with which some Chinese analysts contemplate these pipeline 
projects is based, as we have seen, on a conviction that they will reduce China’s 
reliance on seaborne oil imports, which, they fear, may be easily interdicted in 
time of crisis. Too many of the (relatively few) analyses of these issues produced 
thus far have, however, failed to consider the physical and economic realities of 
oil transshipment, which greatly complicate seaborne oil blockade operations. 
High Transport and Construction Costs 
Importing oil into southwest China through a Burma–China pipeline rather 
than through an expanded pipe network serving existing oil ports at Maoming 
and elsewhere in South China will be very costly. Pipelines are expensive to con-
struct in frontier regions like Burma, and new deepwater oil-import jetties and 
associated storage facilities will have to be built at the pipeline start point on the 
Burmese coast. Pipeline shipping will also be very expensive relative to mari-
time shipping, as pumping oil through the planned Burmese line could cost 
more than four dollars a barrel, assuming that CNPC seeks at least a 10 percent 
internal rate of return in operating the line.59 
In contrast, shipping oil by sea from the Persian Gulf to South China can 
cost as little as US$1.00 per barrel for transport costs, and piping it to interior 
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refi neries in areas likely to be served by the Burma–China line would cost an 
additional two or three dollars a barrel.* This represents a substantial cost sav-
ings over moving crude through the proposed Burma–China line to refi neries 
in Yunnan. To lower “stated” project costs, the NDRC might subsidize project 
fi nancing or take other measures to reward CNPC, any of which would cost the 
Chinese government more than if it relied on seaborne imports to South China 
for supplying pipelines to the interior.
At newbuild prices for very large crude carriers (VLCCs), roughly $140 mil-
lion per vessel, one could build fourteen ships for the two-billion-dollar estimat-
ed price of the Burma–China pipeline. Given that each VLCC carries roughly 
two million barrels of crude and that the round-trip from the Persian Gulf to 
southeast China takes thirty total days, fourteen additional supertankers could 
deliver an average of 666,000 bpd of crude, versus 200,000 bpd for the planned 
pipeline. The cost disparity between maritime and pipeline shipping would be 
even greater for the Pakistan–China line, through which it could cost up to 10 
dollars to move a barrel of oil to Ürümqi in western China.60 After reaching 
Ürümqi, the oil would have to be piped an additional three or four thousand 
kilometers to reach major east coast demand centers, meaning that transport 
costs from the Persian Gulf to Chinese end users could exceed fi fteen dollars a 
barrel, as opposed to closer to US$2.00/barrel (bbl) for oil transported from the 
Gulf to eastern China on supertankers as of March 2009 (the peak equivalent 
approached $4–$5/bbl in July 2008; during this time, however, pipeline opera-
tors raised rates as well).61
Growing Demand in Pipeline Terminus Region
Driven by earthquake reconstruction in Sichuan, the rapid development of 
Chongqing, and other regional growth, oil product demand in interior southwest 
China is on the upswing and will continue to grow strongly as the government 
promotes further growth of domestic consumption. Chongqing’s mayor says the 
city, which is analogous to “China’s Chicago” for its position as a linchpin inland 
economic powerhouse, will see 14.5 percent year-on-year gross domestic prod-
uct growth in 2009.62 Building more local refi ning capacity and expanding the 
domestic pipeline system into underserved areas would be a more secure and 
lower-cost way of ensuring oil and product supplies while still creating jobs.
Physical Security Risks
Pipelines face substantial physical security risks. In fact, with the Burma and 
Pakistan pipelines, there would be a twofold vulnerability. First, oil would have 
* Based on costs of moving oil and refi ned products from the sea to and from inland Russian refi neries, 
which are at a distance from seaports similar to that at which plants at the terminus of the Burma–China 
line would be.
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to be brought by sea to the pipeline terminus via long sea-lanes, concentrating 
the target set for an enemy force.63 Then, it would have to be pumped through a 
long line traversing remote terrain in potentially insecure areas.64
Pipelines are typically more vulnerable to sustained disruptions than are 
ships. Tankers at sea can be rerouted, while pipelines are fi xed links between a 
producer and consumer. Terrorists and insurgents have mounted only a handful 
of successful attacks on oil tankers (for example, Limburg, off Yemen in 2002; 
and Sirius Star, off Kenya in November 2008). However, nonstate actors in Co-
lombia, Nigeria, Iraq, and other countries have been able to disrupt oil pipeline 
operations on a consistent basis despite preventative efforts by local security 
forces. As for China, CNPC reports that from 2002 to 2006, thieves “have il-
legally drilled into” its pipelines “18,382 times . . . causing the company a loss of 
more than 500 million RMB ($72 million).”65 
Pipelines offer a wealth of targeting options to nonstate actors and opposing 
militaries.66 Destroying or damaging the pipeline itself is relatively simple; an at-
tacker simply needs to know where the line is, dig down to it if necessary (some, 
though not all, pipelines are buried), and use explosives to rupture it.67 Such 
attacks typically cause only brief disruptions, as spare line is relatively cheap 
and simple to stock, and repairs can usually be carried out quickly—although 
repair crews would have more trouble working in remote areas, whose popula-
tions in Burma or Pakistan might be armed and hostile. More critical pipeline 
vulnerabilities include pump stations, storage facilities, pipeline termini, and 
the power supplies that run pumps and other key equipment.68 On one hand, 
most of these facilities would be more diffi cult for nonstate groups to target 
successfully, because government forces could concentrate their resources on 
protecting such discrete facilities, as opposed to several thousand kilometers of 
pipe. On the other hand, electrical power generators, transmission towers, and 
buried cables can be attacked as readily as pipelines. Disrupting power supplies 
would reduce throughput in the best case and could halt it completely if attacks 
became suffi ciently severe (e.g., were conducted simultaneously at different 
points). According to Li Wei, director of the center for counterterrorism studies 
at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, “Though ter-
rorists are more likely to aim at causing a large number of casualties instead of 
attacking pipelines in China, there is still the possibility.”69
During an interstate confl ict, however, the dynamics would be quite different. 
Modern military forces equipped with precision-guided munitions could target 
pumping stations and other vital points, many of which run through remote 
areas with low populations, and rapidly disable pipelines carrying oil or gas into 
China. A maritime blockade, on the other hand, would be extremely diffi cult 
to conduct effectively. Oil cargoes in normal commerce may change ownership 
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ten or more times while a ship is at sea, which reduces the effectiveness of a 
distant blockade since it is challenging to identify a cargo’s fi nal destination.70 
Moreover, if implementing a close blockade of the Chinese coast would solve 
the destination-identifi cation problem, it would also bring the blockader’s forces 
within range of numerous and capable Chinese access-denial systems, including 
ballistic and cruise missiles, naval mines, and submarines.71 In short, the fl ex-
ibility of modern maritime oil transport confers far greater oil-supply security 
benefi ts than would pipelines supplied by sea or traversing unstable regions.
A BAROMETER OF CHINESE TRUST IN MARKETS 
Absent discovery of an economically viable large-scale substitute for crude oil, 
pipeline development will likely be insuffi cient to offset China’s rising seaborne 
oil import demand. A simple comparison of planned oil pipeline supply addi-
tions to China’s likely overall demand growth in coming years bears this out, as 
demand growth will very likely outstrip overland supply additions under even 
the most optimistic scenarios. 
Some projects (e.g., the Burma line) make sense from local and corporate 
perspectives but not that of national oil security. The Burma line will be expen-
sive to build. The numbers can be “massaged” to ensure that offi cially tabu-
lated project costs remain near the stated fi gure of two billion dollars, but the 
real costs could be much higher. Also, given Burma’s high political risk and 
the fact that placing a pipeline terminus along the poorly defensible Burmese 
coast might invite interdiction during wartime, relying on shipments through 
the Burma line would not enhance China’s oil security. This increases transport 
cost and concentrates the target set for an adversary during a confl ict but does 
not provide the same supply security gains that a pipeline from Kazakhstan or 
Russia can deliver.
A more secure approach might entail building a more comprehensive pipe grid 
connecting southern Chinese oil ports in Guangdong to the interior southwest 
provinces. Construction costs would likely be similar (possibly lower, without 
the political and security risks inherent in Burma). In addition, the immediate 
and long-term economic benefi ts could be high, since enhancing China’s inter-
nal oil and products transportation grid would boost and stabilize fuel supplies 
to Guangxi and other relatively impoverished inland provinces in which Beijing 
hopes to catalyze development. 
Other lines are simply unviable from nearly all perspectives. The very idea of 
a Pakistan line, with its formidable geography, its regional instability, and the 
absence of a major demand center at the terminus, exemplifi es this chimera. 
That is not to say that there is no logical role for pipelines in China’s oil import 
portfolio. Some pipeline projects are driven by geographic reality (e.g., the line 
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already delivering oil from Kazakhstan and the line under construction from 
Russia). The fi elds fi lling these lines are so far from the sea that an overland line 
is the most effective way to transport their oil into the Chinese market. Pipelines 
move oil much more cheaply than rail can. But, as happened in the early years 
of China’s “Going Out” strategy, special interests also appear to be playing the 
security card to benefi t themselves in the face of more rational, comprehensive 
calculations of national interest. 
At the strategic level, a productive area for future research concerns the na-
val implications of Eurasian energy access, taken more broadly. This could be 
investigated by methodologies similar to those employed in this study to assess 
the relative dependence of China and India (as consumers) and Russia (as a 
supplier) on seaborne energy fl ows between now and 2025. It might be expected 
that Russia’s preponderance of overland energy transport routes will tend to 
reinforce that nation’s traditional continental orientation, whereas increasing 
reliance on seaborne energy imports in China and India will further the blue-
water naval development cited in the Global Trends 2025 report.72 
A continued quest for higher overland oil deliveries will not enhance China’s 
oil supply security substantially but will rather be a barometer of Chinese trust 
in global oil markets and maritime oil transport security. As this article has 
demonstrated, however, Chinese decision makers will ultimately have to face 
the fact that their nation’s dependence on seaborne oil imports is likely only to 
increase. This reality and China’s other growing overseas interests have already 
stimulated debate concerning the extent to which China should develop a blue-
water navy to defend its commerce on the high seas. 
Before Beijing commits fi rmly to such a substantial investment, which is likely 
to have tremendous geopolitical ramifi cations—some of them likely to involve 
counterbalancing by regional nations discomfi ted by such ambitious Chinese 
naval growth—it would be wise to see if China and the United States can come 
to a better understanding of their respective roles in the Asia-Pacifi c as well as 
work to clarify areas ripe for mutually benefi cial energy security cooperation. 
Such strategic dialogue would be diffi cult to pursue, and it would not in itself 
resolve the substantial differences in national interests. But the economic inter-
dependence between the two nations and the potential costs of miscommunica-
tion are so high that repeated efforts must be made. 
This is a critical time in China’s naval development, and the events of the next 
few years will have disproportionate infl uence. As a Chinese analyst at a high-
level government institution told one of the authors recently, China’s naval de-
velopment will hinge on “China’s understanding of the international system. If 
China feels that it is possible to rely on the international oil market, at least some 
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in China believe that a larger navy is unnecessary.” A good fi rst step would be to 
encourage Beijing to join two related international organizations. Washington 
should take the lead in trying to bring Beijing into the International Renewable 
Energy Agency (IRENA); as well as the International Energy Agency (IEA), as 
it meets the requirement to store 90 days of import reserves, so that strategic 
petroleum reserve inventories can be tracked and reported. 
Even these modest measures may require time. The Chinese government is 
unlikely to immediately initiate a detailed oil inventory reporting system. Re-
cent steps—such as the decision in late 2009 to stop publishing PetroChina and 
Sinopec’s refi ned products inventories—are worrisome. The growing acrimony 
over proposed carbon emission restrictions in the wake of the disappointing 
December 2009 Copenhagen climate meetings also does not bode well for quick 
progress on diplomatic initiatives seeking Chinese oil inventory transparency in 
the next one to two years.
Despite these ongoing challenges, there remains room for optimism. The Oc-
tober 2007 issuance of a new maritime strategy by the U.S. sea services suggests 
that Washington is eager to support cooperative, collective approaches to mari-
time energy security. Discussion among China, the United States, and other key 
energy market stakeholders may facilitate adoption of energy security measures 
far more effective and mutually benefi cial than expensive, limited-capacity, and 
vulnerable pipelines.
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